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“Our natural mode is therefore not compromise 
but ‘irony’ – the inescapable response 
to the presence and pressures of opposites in tension. 
Irony is the key to our identity.” Malcolm Ross (1954)
Introduction
Canada will have to meet the challenge of living with the three fundamental challenges of 21st century
society: complexity, new forms of collaboration, and citizen engagement. The new information and
communication technologies, and the greater connectedness they have generated, are only one of the
families of forces – albeit an important one – that have increased the level of relevant complexity,
uncertainty and turbulence of the Canadian system. Canada has also become over the last thirty years
(partly by design and partly due to circumstances) dramatically more demographically variegated,
culturally diverse, socially diversified, and politically complicated. Finally, it has also evolved into
a country in which citizens have become not only better informed and better able to express their
dissent, but also better equipped to assert their multiple identities and to demand participation in the
governing of their affairs. As a result, the coordination problems that Canada has been confronted with
and has had to resolve have become increasingly daunting.
This quantum of additional variety and complexity has been denied or downplayed significantly by
ideologues from the left and the right – ces terribles simplificateurs whose purpose is to propose a
flat-earth view of reality in order to rationalize the choice of “the solution” (more state intervention,
lower taxes,  etc.) they are propounding. These solutionists’ calls for univocal responses  –  whether
the “solution” is meant to rely on the powers of  the invisible hand of the market or of the hidden
(hiding?) hand of government – have compounded the difficulties. 
Fortunately, ordinary Canadians have been more pragmatic: they have acknowledged the greater
variety in the environment as incontournable, and have built on this premise a more pluralistic set of
reactions better able to deal with it: they have embraced the old Ashby law of requisite variety (Ashby
1970). Such an  approach has required  more of a bottom-up, muddling-through, distributed and
collaborative governance  based on the more or less successful efforts at coordination of a large
number of actors and participants – in lieu of the simple top-down hierarchical process of governing
that was in good currency in earlier and less complex times. 
This  paper  proceeds  in  four stages. First, it defines Canadian distinctiveness as an  habitus
characterized by irony and bricolage. Second, it explains why Canada has been rather slow in
adapting its governance to cope with the challenges of its disconcerted learning socio-economy.
Three, it suggests that repairs for the many different forms of disconcertion that have been noted
require a more vibrant  bricolage communautaire – dealing with disconcertion in a low key,
differently from place to place, with the use of different assets, skills and capabilities. Four, it
illustrates, through vignettes of what is happening on three construction sites, how the Canadian
governance system of the 21st century is evolving.3
From bonding to loose intermediation
While much has been written about the decline of social cohesion and the transformation of Canadian
sociality over the last few decades (Helliwell 1996; Paquet 1996, 1997a,1998a), most of it has been
couched in terms of erosion of the old bonding social capital that was so good at undergirding
reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity (Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000): the erosion of the superglue of
family, church, community, hierarchies, etc., an erosion ascribable to the fact that these institutions
were not nimble enough to fit the requirements of the new knowledge-based learning economy. Much
less work has been done on what would appear to be required to construct a new sociality, one  based
on much weaker ties and more loosely coupled networks (Granovetter 1973; Paquet 1999a). 
In Canada, the transition from bonding to loose coupling has been less smooth and rapid than it should
have been because of a significant resistance to this sort of virage by a portion of the federal elites.
This has led to a vigorous counter-argument being mounted in favor of “bridging social capital” – the
need for a fairly high degree of centralization to be maintained in order to bolster redistribution, and
therefore to save the country from falling apart. This has been presented as “the Canadian way”
(Paquet 1995a; Chrétien 2000).
This rearguard action has been fueled by the degree of diffraction of Canadian society generated by
greater complexity and heterogeneity and a demand for greater citizen participation. It was wrongly
presumed by Pierre Elliott Trudeau (among other leaders in Canada) that a response to these
challenges was to be found in overarching principles, abstract norms or grand designs or narratives.
One of the most prominent of these intellectual devices has been the focus on human rights and the
judiciarization of governance via charters, courts, commissions etc. This has acted as an extraordinary
support for a more centralized and hierarchical system. Such schemes are most often intellectually
disingenuous, practically unhelpful, and perhaps even dangerous for democracy (Gauchet 2000). 
More recently, there have been efforts in Canada to hide such centralizing schemes  behind efforts at
“branding” Canada – a language falling halfway between business and rodeo lingoes – or efforts at
creating new devices aimed at “bridging” across divisions. These have been novel ways of
redistributing income and wealth across regions, social groups, and organizations as a way to equalize
their circumstances, and thereby reduce social tensions and envy. Many people in public discourses
have even come to declare  these redistributive schemes to be the social cement that binds Canadians
together, and constitutes their “distinctiveness”. 
But “distinctiveness” is neither a matter of “branding” nor one of “bridging”. It connotes a dynamic
“habitus” or “manière d’être” while  branding refers to static “markers” and “identifiers”. As for the
seemingly innocuous language of “bridging” “across big divisions in a society...across what are
potentially big fractures in a society between rich and poor, between language groups, ...”  – the
language used by the Canadian Senate Committee on Social Affairs (1999) – this is an equally
misleading way to trivialize a manière d’être by reducing it to fiscal plumbing. 
 
Bonding, with its exclusiveness, is an echo of the traditional society, and does not fit the realities of4
modern Canada; bridging, with its emphasis on mechanical redistributive schemes,does not either.
Circumstances would appear to call for looser and more temporary coupling – “cohabitation avec
commutation” (i.e., a system in which anyone can claim or deny attachment)  – but  these weak ties can
nevertheless provide much strength (Granovetter 1973; Guillaume 1999; Putnam 2000). This is the
paradoxical result of a number of reflections on the Canadian  perplexities generated by Canada’s
experience in creating a new “multiculture” (Paquet 1999d:ch.7; Iyer 2000:Part IV).
Fortunately, these subtleties have not been lost on Canadian citizens. Their response qua citizens (to
both the new circumstances and to the ‘magnificent’ efforts to deal with them grandiosely) has been
much irony vis-à-vis grand schemes and a plea for bricolage first and foremost to effect the needed
repair to the institutional order.   
The drift from bonding to loose intermediation has however been slowed down by efforts to impose
either-or choices on Canadians (when the new realities confronting Canadians called for choices of
the more-or-less variety –  less centralization, more subsidiarity in the name of efficiency, etc.) or
redistributive  bridging  schemes  (when  what  was  required  to  facilitate  risk-taking  and  to  ease
transition in a high-risk society was better insurance schemes).   As a result, Canadians have over the
last decades  defined their “distinctiveness” almost despite their leaders, and they have been quite
effective at it. And this distinctiveness as habitus has been characterized by expressions such as  “a
passion for bronze” (Valaskakis) or “slow adrenaline” (Iyer). 
The rejection of grand schemes by the majority of Canadians has at times been deplored as occasions
manquées. But Canadians, with their hefty dose of tolerance and apathy, are ironists,  “never quite
able to take themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in which they describe
themselves are subject to change”, and they spend much time worrying about the possibility of having
been initiated into the wrong tribe, and taught to play the wrong language game (Rorty 1989:73-75).
Thus they prefer (1)  understatement,  irony and self-mockery in their rhetoric, and they most certainly
resist being “branded” like cattle, or “bridged” in a crippling way in the face of liquid modernity
(Bauman 2000); and (2) they prefer a sort of pragmatism and adhoc bricolage in their practice, and
a gamble on a combination of plural, partial and limited identities even though it often actually
increases the distances between groups of Canadians. This is the Canadian distinctiveness. 
Malcolm Ross put it very aptly almost fifty years ago when he said : “we are inescapably, and almost
from the first, ... the people of the second thought. To remain a people at all, we have had to think
before we speak, even to think before we think. Our characteristic prudence is ... this necessity for
taking second thought...” (Ross 1954:ix). In 2000, an outside observer like Pico Iyer (2000) has comes
almost to the same conclusion using almost the same words. 
This pragmatic liberalism, couched in a prudent pluralistic and ironic language, has often led to
discourses that are difficult for outsiders to decode and understand. Canadians will often pretend
ignorance and willingness to learn from others for the sake of making the other person’s errors
conspicuous by means of their adroit questioning. They will  even slide into “a manner of discourse
in which what is literally said is meant to express its opposite”. 
Canada as a disconcerted learning socio-economy 5
The transition from an industrial age to a knowledge-based economy, experienced over the last few
decades,  has revealed  a separation between the world of physical objects and the world of ideas.
These two worlds  live according to quite different rules. On the one hand, the world of physical
objects is characterized by scarcity and diminishing returns, and focused mainly on allocative
efficiency in a static  world. On the other hand, the world of ideas  is essentially  scarcity-free,
inhabited by  increasing returns, and focused on Schumpeterian efficiency (i.e., on the discontinuities
in the knowledge base over time, and in the dynamic learning ability of the new evolving arrangements
these entail) (Boisot 1995). Canada is still deeply rooted in the old economy, but it is shifting more
and more toward a world dominated by the logic of the new learning economy. 
1. The learning socio-economy
In the new economy, the success of individuals, firms, regions and national economies has come to
depend upon their capacity to learn to a much greater extent than had been the case before. In such a
context, responsive or passive flexibility cannot suffice. What is required is innovative flexibility:
learning, and not simply adapting (Killick 1995).
The emergence of the learning economy has transformed the division of labour in Canada and the
Canadian social fabric. While in the industrial world, a technical division of labour based on hyper-
specialization was  efficient,  such travail en miettes does not promote learning. In order for learning
to proceed; one must build on conversations, on communities of interpretation and communities of
practice,  and  specialization  must  proceed  to  a  greater  extent  on the basis of  craft,  i.e.,  of
competencies. This requires a cognitive division of labour (Moati et Mouhoud 1994): a  division of
labour based on learning blocks (innovation systems, skill-based production fragments, etc.) that
entails a very different mode of coordination.
In the old system, coordination meant standardization, and economic integration was a way to effect
standardization. As a result, hierarchical coordination prospered. But in the new system, when the
challenge is to harmonize the capacity to learn and progress together, the organization (private,
public or civic) must focus on its core competencies, but must also consciously recognize that it
operates in an ecosystem and must mobilise its community of allies (Moore 1996).
The challenge to foster collective learning calls for the development of much more horizontal
coordination of a  looser sort among all the stakeholders. And since the relationships with the
stakeholders (suppliers, customers, partners, etc.) cannot be built on simple market relations (because
these may not promote efficient co-learning), networks of relational exchanges have emerged. In such
arrangements, long term relations based on trust are negotiated. Forms of cooperation that would never
otherwise materialize evolve as a result of the emergence of important positive feedback and self-
reinforcing mechanisms that are generated by external economies or neighbourhood effects, and
learning curves yielding increasing returns (Goldberg 1989). 
These dynamic processes, involving the interrelationships of groups of actors,  generate a variety of
conventions of identity and participation among these different agents, and proximity (in the different6
senses of that word – spatial, technological, social, etc.) plays a not insignificant role in the learning
process. Co-learning entails co-evolution in an ecosystem that evolves by finding ways to “charter”
cross-functional teams from which no important power players are left out and, if feasible, in which
“all major players have some stake in the success of the strategy” (Moore 1998: 177; Arthur 1994;
Krugman 1996; Durlauf 1998).
Such are the trends as Canada drifts into the 21st century.
2. Canada’s slouching toward the learning economy
These challenges facing Canada are well known.Yet little in the present structure and functioning of
the Canadian economy, in the private, public or civic sectors, would appear to indicate that Canada
is progressing as well as it might in this transition. 
As a matter of consequence, while Canada scores welll in terms of certain indicators in international
comparisons, when other indicators are used (gross domestic product per capita, Tobin’s measure of
economic welfare, the so-called Genuine Progress Indicator, or Fordham’s index of social health),
they would appear to suggest that Canada’s relative performance  has been deteriorating (Paquet
1997b). This is also reflected in the relative measures of productivity growth, in the coefficient of
attraction of foreign capital by Canada, etc.
One broad hypothesis has been suggested to explain the fact that the Canadian political socio-economy
is losing ground: it is a general failure of the Canadian system to adjust its governance to the new
requirements of the learning economy, and to abandon its antiquated  hierarchical and confrontational
governance structures. According to this diagnosis, the Canadian socio-economy is suffering from
disconcertion:  it  is  disconcerted,  there  is  a  disconnection  between its governance and its
circumstances (Baumard 1996) that has not been noticed, and therefore has not been repaired. Indeed,
as R.D. Laing would have put it, Canadians have failed to notice that they have failed to notice this
discrepancy. 
It has been noted by many observers that the Canadian socio-economy remains marred by important
cleavages and  torn by adversarial systems (federal-provincial, public-private, labour-management,
small firms against one another, etc.) that have prevented it from developing into an effective learning
economy  (Valaskakis 1990). Indeed, the  major conclusion of a recent study by the Public Policy
Forum is that  the most important source of Canada’s relatively lacklustre performance on the
productivity front is the lack of a culture of cooperation, especially between government and business
(Public Policy Forum1993). André Burelle (1995) has shown extremely well that the federal-
provincial quagmire is not far behind as a major source of  friction that prevents the development of
an effective coordination/governance system.  
3. States as catalysts7
Some have argued, quite rightly,  that tension and disconcertion may not all be bad. They are also a
fount of novelty and a source of enhanced learning: heterogeneity and somewhat weaker interpersonal
ties – less groupthink – may yield more innovation than a very homogeneous order. But excessively
confrontational patterns of interaction slow down learning. The central challenge is to ensure the
requisite flexibility of the  institutional system so as to bring "the skills, experience and knowledge
of different people, organizations and government agencies together, and get them to interact in new
ways" (Johnson 1992:43). But this requires an important social capital of trust, and, in Canada, the
social capital needed for such cooperation is eroding.
The World Values Surveys provide a very rough gauge of the evolution of the degree of interpersonal
trust and associative behaviour over the past few decades. Despite the jelly-like character of the
available data, some important trends would appear to have emerged: 1) the degree of confidence and
trust in one's neighbours has remained higher in Canada than in the United States; 2) there has been a
significant erosion of social capital in the United States; 3) the gap between the two countries has
declined, meaning a more rapid decline in Canada than in the United States; and 4) the decline of trust
and associative behaviour has been even more rapid in French Canada than in the rest of Canada over
this period of the post-Quiet Revolution (Paquet 1996, 1997a; Helliwell 1996). Given this significant
relative erosion of the social capital of trust in Canada (and even more in Quebec), one should not be
surprised by the failure of various initiatives à la Gérald Tremblay to stimulate networks or industrial
clusters in Quebec. The requisite social glue was not there, and there is little evidence that public
policies have been at work to develop the requisite new type of social capital that would allow
learning networks to thrive (Paquet 1999a). 
The state has to rethink its action in the learning economy. As Dalum et al. suggests (1992), this  means
intervening to improve the means to learn (education and training system), the incentive to learn
(government programs supporting projects of cooperation and networks), the capability to learn
(promoting organizations supporting interactive learning: i.e., more decentralized organizations), the
access to relevant knowledge (through  relationships between agents and sources of knowledge, both
through  infrastructure  and mediating structures), but also fostering the requisite amount of
remembering and forgetting (acting to preserve competencies and capabilities, but also helping groups
to move ahead and to let go of older ways). This in turn requires a well-aligned nexus of relations,
networks and regimes. 
States can be important catalysts in the construction of the new “loose intermediation” social capital:
improving relationships here, fostering networks there, developing more or less encompassing formal
or informal regimes in other places.  This is the central role of what some have called the catalytic
state or the resurgent state (Lind 1992; Drezner 1998). 
Currently, this catalytic action is not to vibrant. Canadian governments would appear to remain
characterized by  a certain centralizing mindset, and by a chronic neglect of governance issues
(Paquet 1995a; Canada 2000). It does not mean that the Canadian governance system is not evolving,
or that it does not invent innovative ways to meet the present challenges (Paquet 1999b). But fiscal
imperatives would appear to have mesmerized our governments to such an extent in the last decade
that those in a position to act as a catalyst have missed  key opportunities (Program Review, for
instance) to effect the sort of repairs to the  governance system that might have gone a long way toward8
providing the Canadian political socio-economy with the non-centralized guidance regime it requires
(Paquet and Roy 1995; Paquet and Shepherd 1996).
So if one had to characterize Canada, retroactively so to speak, one might stylize Canada as follows:
(1) a disconcerted socio-economy caught in a tectonic transition between an old, somewhat centralized
political economy and a new somewhat more decentralized and subsidiarity-driven one, and (2)
experiencing a sort of relative lull in its socio-economic performance and a mild form of midlife
identity crisis. Moreover, in the faced of these circumstances,  Canadians are perplexed but also
persuaded both that (1)  there is no simple fix to their predicament and (2) their “passion for bronze”
(Valaskakis) –  in other words their belief that “le mieux est l’ennemi du bien” – may not be such a
bad thing after all. 
New capabilities and bricolage communautaire
There are times when the evolution of the institutional order is such that one can really speak of a
change of kind, and not simply a change of degree. Such a tectonic but silent change has been under
way in Canada in the last few decades (Paquet 1999c).To cope with an ever more turbulent global
environment, Canadian organizations have had to evolve and to learn to use their environment  more
and more strategically, in much the same way that the real surfer uses the real wave. 
Managers  in  the  private,  public and civic sectors have had to exploit not only the favorable
environmental circumstances, but also the full complement of imagination and resourcefulness in the
heart and mind of each team player; they had to become team leaders in task force-type projects,
quasi-entrepreneurs capable of cautious sub-optimizing in the face of a turbulent environment (Paquet
1996-7, 1998a, 1999d). This dual sort of challenge has pressed public, private and civic organizations
to design  lighter, more horizontal and modular structures, to create  networks and informal clan-like
rapports, and to develop new rules for the game. In general, this has generated some pressure  for non-
centralization, for an expropriation of the power to steer that was once held by the top managers. 
1. Distributed governance
As globalization proceeds, international economic integration increases, and the component parts of
the system become more numerous, the central driving force is the pressure to organize for faster
learning and more innovation, and this occurs when the actors, confronted with different local
realities, are empowered to take decisions on the spot. In this way, international integration has led
to some erosion of the relevance of the nation-state – globalization has led to localization of decision-
making, to the dispersion of power, and to a more distributed governance process.
These new modularized  organizations cannot impose their views on their clients, or members. Indeed,
there has been a significant decline in deference to authority in all sectors. To compete effectively,
firms, in much the same way as state or civic organizations, must consult: they are moving  toward a
greater use of the distributed  intelligence and ingenuity of their members. A good example is Linux.
The strategic organization is becoming a broker, an  animateur; and, in this network, a consultative and
participative mode obtains among firms,  states, and  communities. The reason for this is that the  the
best learning experience appears to be effected through  flexible intersectoral teams, woven by moral9
contracts and reciprocal obligations negotiated in the context of evolving partnerships.(Paquet 1992,
1994a, 1995b, 1996-7, 1997c).
This entails  a major qualitative change. It introduces the network paradigm within the governance
process (Cooke and Morgan 1993; Castells 1996, 1997, 1998). This paradigm not only dominates the
transactions of the civic sector, but permeates the operations of both the state and market sectors. The
network is not, as is usually assumed, a mixed form of organization existing halfway along a continuum
ranging from market to hierarchy. Rather, it is a generic name for a third type of arrangement, built on
very different integrating mechanisms: networks are consensus/inducement-oriented organizations and
institutions (Kumon 1992; Amin and Thrift 1995; Acs, de la Mothe and Paquet 1996).  
2. Three learning capabilities: relations, networks, regimes 
In the best of all possible worlds, learning relationships, networks and regimes would materialize
organically as a response to the need for nimbleness in the face of accelerating change, and would
become a new form of coordination capable of promoting and fostering effective learning in a society
of flows, where commutation is omnipresent. Moreover, in such a world, when linkages among actors
can be modified and interrupted at any time, culture would  become  an important bond that makes
these networks and regimes operative and effective at collective learning. 
Culture refers to those unwritten values and principles that generate a relatively high level of
coordination, at low cost, by bestowing identity and membership through stories of flexible generality
about events of practice that act as repositories of accumulated wisdom. The evolution of these stories
constitutes collective learning, an evolving way  to interpret conflicting and often confusing data, but
also a social construction of a community of interpretation.
Arie de Geus uses an analogy from evolutionary biology to explain the foundations and different stages
of such collective learning and to identify the loci for action in correcting learning failures: the ability
of individuals to move around and to be exposed to different challenges (new relations), the capacity
of individuals to invent new ways to cope creatively in the face of new circumstances (new networks),
and the process of communication of the new ways from the individual to the entire community (new
regimes) (de Geus 1997). 
First, a certain heterogeneity (as we noted earlier) is an important source of learning, since a
community composed of identical individuals with similar history or experiences is less likely to
extract  much new insight from a given environment. However, there must be a sufficient degree of
trust to sustain learning. This in turn requires a cultural basis of differences that members recognize
and share (Drummond 1981-82). This “cultural” basis of heterogeneity and trust, and the mastery of
weak ties (i.e., the capacity to build strong relations on weak ties), are obviously dimensions  that can
be nurtured and represent a critical capability (Laurent et Paquet 1998). 
Second, learning is not about transmission of abstract knowledge from one person's head to another
person's head: it is about the "embodied ability to behave as community members". It is fostered by
contacts with the outside, by facilitating access to and membership in the community-of-practice. Trust
is at the core of the fabric of such networks and communities of practice that transform "labourers into10
members", an employment contract into a membership contract (Handy 1995). 
Third, belonging is one of the most powerful agents of mobilization. So what is required is an
important "moral" component to the new membership contract, to make it less contractual and more
interactive. This new refurbished moral contract is "a network of civic engagement...which can serve
as a cultural template for future collaboration...and broaden the participants' sense of self... enhancing
the participants' "taste" for collective benefits"(Putnam 1995). These loose arrangements or regimes
require  a certain degree of interaction and proximity, and these are important features of the learning
process.
Relations, networks and regimes constitute layers of capability in the process of governance. They
evolve as the Canadian socio-economy is transsubtantiated, but it appears to many observers that this
is happening neither fast enough nor in an integrated enough way: the process is evolving  lentement
et par morceau. As a result, the emerging governance process resembles a patchwork quilt, becoming
ever more complex as the environment evolves from placid (Type 1) to turbulent (Type 4) (Emery and
Trist 1965). 
In our new high-risk and turbulent environment, strategic hierarchical management is no longer
sufficient. What is required is the development of capacities for collaborative action in managing large
scale re-organizations and structural changes at the macro level: the ground is in motion, acting
independently not only may not ensure effectiveness, but it may even make things worse and amplify
disintegrative tendencies. What is required is collective action by “dissimilar organizations whose
fates are, basically, positively correlated”. This requires  trust-enhancing mechanisms like stronger
relationships, networks and regimes.
Metcalfe has synthesized these sorts of predicament, and the challenges underpinning them,  in a
catastrophe theory type graph (below) depicting the major aspects of the issue in three dimensions:
the degree of complexity of the environment, the quality of management/governance capacities, and
the level of governance effectiveness. He shows that as complexity increases (from Type 3 to 4) ,
management capacities must improve, to avoid the disintegration of the system. If these capacities
already exist, they must be brought into use (a-b); if they do not exist, they must be developed (e-b).
If they do not exist and no development effort is made (e-f), or if the capacity building is inadequate,
(e-c-d), disintegration ensues. 
3. Deficits on the capabilities front
It is easy to document that there has been a decline of trust and an erosion of social capital, that the
pattern of networks defining the old Canada has been weakened, and that the governance structures
have consequently been less helpful than they might have been. This situation has not been improved
by the Canadian  tradition of self-doubt that is extremely difficult to shake off. 
And yet, while, as Jan Morris (quoted in Iyer 2000:122) would put it, Toronto is “a capital of the
unabsolute”,  it is also an extraordinary successful experiment in multiculturalism, and one of the most
peaceful cities of such size in North America. Organically, Canada would appear to be able to distill
a way of life capable of accommodating this growing diversity and to do it somewhat unconsciously.11
This does not necessarily provide the basis for a satisfactory strategy for improvement in other realms:
it only indicates a general direction for action. 
The only thing that would appear to be  is that Canadians feel that  there might be ways to catalyze
those local processes, to improve the situation  on all three of these fronts (trust relations, networks,
regimes).
On the civil society front, the repairs  have to help to regenerate some new forms of loose solidarity
at the very time time that diversity is growing exponentially, and shared values appear to have
diminished. Boutique multiculturalism and the reliance on symbolic recognition devices would not
appear  to  be  satisfactory  strategies  (Fish  1999).  And  yet,  given  the  fact that Canadians are
hypersensitive to any form of intolerance, such new weak ties cannot be constructed on any
retribalization that would carry with it any sort of exclusion.   
On the political front, we in Canada now live in a world of plural, limited and partial identities in
which multiple citizenships are common currency. A rethinking of the notion of citizenship is
necessary to accommodate these new realities (Paquet 1989, 1994b), but one has also to reconsider
the existing political structures and to modify them in the sense of a greater decentralization in order
to provide maximum leverage to the strategic/catalytic state (Lind 1992; Paquet 1996-97). 
On the economic front, what is necessary is the development of a stronger basis for stakeholder
capitalism, and the transformation of the property-rights regime: a shift from the absolute property
rights doctrine in good currency in the English-speaking legal tradition (shareholders own absolutely
all the enterprise), and the formality of market contracting,  toward a pluralistic and more
encompassing view of property rights and a greater reliance on relational, trust-based and moral
contracts (Paquet and Roy 2000). 12
Complexity, management capacity and effectiveness
in a catastrophe theory stylization
Source: L. Metcalfe 1998 (p.28)13
4. Assets, skills and styles behind these capabilities
To ascertain what might be required to improve the present situation in the private, public, and civic
sectors, one must go behind these capabilities and probe into the assets, skills, and styles of
coordination that currently underpin governance capabilities and shape the Canadian habitus. 
First, in order for these capabilities (relationships, networks, regimes) to be created, and maintained,
there are some requirements: a mix of different sorts of (1) rights and authorities enshrined in  rules;
(2)  resources, i.e., the array of assets made available to individuals and institutions like money, time,
information and facilities; (3) competencies and knowledge, i.e., education, training, experience, and
expertise; and (4) organizational capital, i.e., the capacity to mobilize attention, and to make effective
use of the  first three types of resources (March and Olsen 1995).   
Second, Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus (1997) have shown that the engines of entrepreneurship (private
sector), democratic action (public sphere), and cultivation of solidarity (civil society) are quite
similar. They are based on a particular skill that Spinosa, et al call ‘history-making’,  that can be
decomposed into three sub-skills: (1) acts of articulation -- attempts at ‘définition de situation’ or new
ways to make sense of the situation; (2) acts of cross-appropriation -- to bring new practices into a
context that would not naturally generate them; and (3) acts of reconfiguration -- to reframe the whole
perception of the way of life. Such individual actions are necessary, but not sufficient to generate new
capabilities, nor to trigger the required bricolage in the different worlds. As Putnam (2000) puts it,
the renewal of the stock of social capital (relationships, networks, regimes) is a task that requires the
mobilization of communities. This in turn means that we must be able to ensure that these actions
resonate with communities of interpretation and practice -- what Spinosa, et al call “worlds”.
Third, there is no way one can hope to transform these  “worlds” (in the private, public, and civic
spheres) unless one can first disclose these “worlds”  (in the sense that we use the word when we
speak of the “world of business” or the “world of medicine”). By “world”, we mean a “totality of
interrelated pieces of equipment, each used to carry out a specific task, such as hammering a nail.
These tasks are undertaken to achieve certain purposes, such as building a house. This activity
enables those performing it to have identities, such as being a carpenter”. Finally, one may refer to
the way in which this world is organized and coordinated as its style (Spinosa et al 1997:17-19).
Articulation, cross-appropriation, and reconfiguration are kinds of style change (making explicit what
was implicit or lost, gaining wider horizons, reframing). In a turbulent environment, the styles of the
different worlds, but also the very nature of the equipment, tasks, and identities are modified. This
transforms the organizational capital, but also the rest of the assets base of the system, and stimulates
a different degree of re-articulation and reconfiguration, and enriches the possibilities of cross-
appropriation.
The distinctiveness of the Canadian system is this ensemble of components: the way the Canadian
system adopts certain patterns of assets and skills, distills capabilities, and constitutes a particular sort
of world. 
We have synthesized this dynamic in the graph below. It depicts the Canadian political socio-economy14
as an “instituted process”, characterized by a particular amalgam of assets, adroitly used and enriched
by political, economic and civic entrepreneurs, through skillful articulation, cross-appropriation, and
reframing activities, and woven into a fabric of relations, networks, and regimes defining the
distinctive habitus of Canada as a complex adaptive system. Such a complex world is disclosed by
an examination of its equipments, tasks and identities, organized and coordinated in a particular way
with a particular style. Modification in the structure of assets, skills, and capabilities is echoed in a
transformation of the Canadian world, but such a transformation also impacts back on the pattern of
assets, skills, and capabilities. 
5. The elusive Canadian style
It is quite tempting to highlight one dimension or one aspect of this nexus of forces, and to suggest that
it has a defining impact on the whole structure. Many have elevated certain patterns of rights to this
role; others have suggested that the whole system revolves around certain identities. In fact, this
misses the central point, that this broad ranging canvas has an overall dynamic, the sort of dynamic
that underpins all social systems. In the words of Donald Schön, a social system “contains structure,
technology and theory. The structure is the set of roles and relations among individual members. The
theory consists of the views held within the social system about its purposes, its operations,its
environment, and its future. Both reflect, and in turn influence, the prevailing technology of the system.
These dimensions all hang together, so that any change in one produces change in the others.” (Schön
1971).
What defines the “Canadian way” is the transversal manner in which these assets, skills, and
capabilities are integrated into a social technology, how they constitute an interpretative scheme and
a stylization of the world, and  how they translate into coordinating governance structures and schemes
of intervention. Such schemes are inspired by a root framework, but take different forms hic et nunc,
because the circumstances call for ad hoc action. Indeed, as was mentioned earlier, this is the very
nature of the Canadian style.
One may observe the “Canadian way” at work in various spheres -- key cauldrons where Canadian
distinctiveness is being shaped (schools, workplaces, cities, arts and culture, politics and government,
etc.). Each of these loci is a laboratory in which Canada has tackled, with greater or lesser success,
the challenges of complexity, collaboration, and citizen engagement in designing an ensemble of
assets, skills, and capabilities that has given its shape to the Canadian habitus.  
While no such local vignettes can pretend to exhaust the Canadian distinctiveness, they may act as
powerful révélateurs of the nature of this distinctly Canadian  manière de voir et de faire, but also
of some features of this distinctiveness that may be en émergence. Such illustrations are useful to
understand the ways in which the Canadian style may  serve the country less effectively than it should,
and to disclose where catalytic action might be required as a matter of priority. 15
But what may be most fundamental in the characterization of the Canadian style is that Canada is the
“capital of the unabsolute”, that Canadians are uncomfortable with any form of distinbctiveness that
excludes. This, in turn, generates a phenomenal degree of tolerance for diversity, and a robust
rejection of any form of embrigadement that binds.     16
In certain circumstances, aloofness may become complacency, irony may lead to denial, tolerance to
diffraction, openness to the erosion of the differences between the outside and the indide, and political
correctness to greater social distance between groups. So this particular manière de voir et d’être is
not without a dark side that has some time been exploited by shrewd manipulators to manufacture
denial and complacency.
Three problematic cauldrons
We have chosen three loci to illustrate this Canadian distinctiveness  en acte: workplace and
enterprise, education and health, and the national multilogue about patriotism and social cohesion.
(1) Workplace and enterprise
Canada’s productivity growth has been relatively lacklustre over the last while. This is  linked to
coordination failures in the workplace and enterprise, and to the lack of effective coordination among
the different sectors (private, public, and civic). And yet there is a systematic denial of the seriousness
of this situation and feats of analytics to demonstrate that, despite the stagnation of Canadian’s material
standard of living , everything is all right with our total well-being.
Canadians have an uncanny capacity to occlude their macro-organizational problems. John Porter had
considerable difficulty in persuading the equality-conscious Canadian population of the 1960s that
Canada was a vertical mosaic of classes and elites (Porter 1965). In the same manner, Canadians are
in denial in the face of ample evidence that the Canadian governance apparatus is marred by hierarchy
and  confrontations,  and  that  this  situation  has  translated  into  a  relative  lag  in adopting new
technologies, an immense lag in the productivity of our service sector, and a certain slowness in its
capacity to transform. 
Many of these difficulties are a result of a misalignement of Canada’s structural capital: systems
(processes and outputs), structure (the arrangement of responsibilities and accountabilities between
the stakeholders), strategy (the goals of organizations and the ways sought to achieve them), and
culture (the sum of individual opinions, shared mindsets, values and norms within the organizations)
(Saint-Onge 1996:13). The major barrier to good performance is the misalignment among these four
elements, and, in particular, the disconnections between strategy and culture.
In Canada, the ‘culture’ in which both enterprise and workplace are embedded, and which also shapes
them, is problematic: (1) the framework of corporate law is dominated by the shadow of the
shareholders and does not provide much place for stakeholders (de la Mothe and Paquet 1996); and
(2) the culture of the workplace (which is a significant source of social capital) is not one of learning
and innovation culture, and is not geared to taking full advantage of alliances, partnerships, and
network externalities (de la Mothe and Paquet 1997).
While in dozens of US states corporate law allows boards of directors to allocate portions of the net
operating surplus to stakeholders other than the shareholders (through amenities, better conditions,
etc.), in Canada, any shareholder has the power to sue the board, if it were to adopt such a policy. This
considerably cramps the style of the board in  generating the requisite commitment of these other17
stakeholders. 
The same sort of dysfunction can be seen  in the workplace, where a discourse of confrontation is still
prevalent, along with the centrality of job action as a method of conflict resolution. As a result, the sort
of collaborative governance that might ensure better dynamic (Schumpeterian) performance fails to
materialize. This has resulted in Canada’s relatively poor showing in the OECD league in a number
of areas. 
And yet, the rhetoric of competition and confrontation continues to prevail at the front of the stage,
while new forms of cooperation, partnering and joint venturing materialize every day en catimini in
all sorts of quarters through the land.  So it is not that there is no progress, but it is local and informal
progress (as it should) but without the benefit of a supporting infrastructure.
This is the Canadian way!
(2) Education and health 
Canada spends immense resources on both education and health care, and both the Canadian education
and health care systems are national icons and a source of national pride. This explains our sense of
accomplishment over Canada’s gold medal in the United Nations international ranking of nations in
terms of ‘human development’. 
Canadians boast about their superior systems, and are concerned about the quality of education and
health care, but they turn a blind eye to the important  signs of dysfunction that experts (in Canada and
elsewhere) point to, in both our educational and health care systems. Gross lapses in efficiency and
effectiveness, counterproductive silo-type organizations, and confrontational policy developments,
entailing  important  blindspots,  no voice or role for the users, etc. – all factors  that experts
acknowledge (Keating 1995; Angus and Begin 2000; World Health Organization 2000) but are
deliberately suppressed in public debates in Canada. There is an amazing chasm, for instance,
between the grim reality that Canada spends 50% more than the UK on health care per capita with
results that are inferior to theirs, and the public display of sacramental denial that there might be any
need for repairs in the governance of our ‘superior’ health care system. 
This has led to much damning the two-tiered American systems in both education and health. And yet,
all this occurs with many winks and nods showing some appreciation of the degree of disarray of both
Canadian systems. What is resented is  radical in-your-face criticism of the Canadian systems. They
are regarded as most unhelpful (if not unpatriotic) and as likely to discourage action à petits pas meant
to repair those systems.        
For instance: young Canadians spend  significantly fewer days in class each year than their colleagues
in other advanced countries; a recent report has suggested that up to 40% of the high school students
in Ottawa are dysfunctional as learners (Keating 1995:82); our commitment to life- long learning is
minimal; the resources dedicated to formal manpower training remain a fraction of the sums spent by
our industrialized competitors in Europe and Asia (one third of what is committed by Germany, ten
percent of what is committed by Japan). And the same critical diagnosis might be made about our18
health care system: a very chaotic system that generates indices of morbidity and mortality well above
what one might expect, and yet at quite high a cost (Angus and Bégin 2000).
Obviously, in the face of suppressed criticism,  a major overhaul of both systems is most unlikely.
What is most likely is  a magnificent and uncompromising rhetorical defense of the status quo, while,
through a piecemeal and quasi-underground approach, establishments will select particular reforms
and somewhat covertly implement them. Any radical challenge will continue to be denounced as a
betrayal of our “perfect” institutions. This is the way in which ‘universality’ was assassinated in
Canada: piecemeal, covertly, without a national debate, while on the hustings the political classes
pretended that they were staunchly defending it. 
This might explain what Harold Innis meant when he said  “a social scientist in Canada can only
survive by virtue of a sense of humour” (quoted in Neill 1972:93). 
(3) National multilogue about patriotism and social cohesion
As  global  integration  proceeds  ever more deeply, the nation-state has been transformed. Its
territoriality has become problematic to the extent that borders have become porous, its sovereignty
has begun to become unbundled, and this has led the citizen to a re-assessment of what belonging
means.  The problem of belonging echoes the new situation where Canadians are themselves
increasingly of mixed origins, and authority has become dispersed in a multiplicity of sites. A
multiplicity of allegiances have ensued. While citizens have traditionally associated their main loyalty
with the nation-state, the state has lost its privileged position as the main anchor of belonging, as non-
territorial modes of organization have become increasingly important (Elkins 1995: 74-75).
New principles of social cohesion are en émergence, and we know that they are likely to evolve at
the local level and to echo a non-centralizing philosophy, but the timing of the tipping moment into
a new sociality remains largely unpredictable at this time. 
Not all observers agree on the reality of this tectonic change. Many continue to hold the view that
“bridging capital” has been the basis of the Canadian ‘social glue’ that has bound us together in the
past, and to build on it arguments that it should remain the central adhesive in the years to come.
This is the position of the Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology of the
Senate of Canada (Canada 1999) which has suggested that the three pillars on which the sense of
social  cohesion of Canadians rested in the post World War II were the federal programs of
redistribution of income; the shared-costs programs through wich the federal government provided
federals grants to support health care, postsecondary education and social assistance; and the system
of grants to equalize the average quality of public services throughout the country. Thus the Committee
suggests that nothing short of a new wave of federal institutions can provide the requisite degree of
security to Canadians through redistribution. 
This is the central theme used by those who argue that medicare is what makes Canada hang together,
and that anything that threatens the present inter-regional process of money laundering is bound to put
the Canadian edifice in peril. 19
This “bridging social capital” interpretation may not be anything more than a slogan in aid of
rationalizing compulsive centralism (because it is necessary for redistribution) but it has been
propounded by certain groups in English Canada as a founding national myth.  The same persons who
defend this view of income and wealth redistribution’s supplying the essential Canadian social glue
have also found evidence of a latent demand for such glue, and evidence of latent patriotism in the
Molson beer commercial “My name is Joe and I am Canadian”. This is surprising. 
In such a bizarre rendition, Canadians as a people that defiantly harbours limited and multiple
identities are characterized, almost in the same breath, as both crassly opportunistic in defining
themselves through some federal- provincial fiscal plumbing arrangement and, at the same time, as
naively sentimental. 
Another interpretation is rooted in our national irony and our taste for bricolage.       
Medicare is a prime example of a popular federal redistributive scheme. It is a collectively expensive
scheme, in which health care is presented to the population as a free good, through the hiding hand of
the state. It is hardly surprising that the population is favourably disposed toward such a scheme. The
fact that the elected officials have wished to be seen as providers of a valuable free good is also
hardly surprising. This manufactured win-win situation (in which the population pretends that it
receives free and universal health care, and the politicians pretend that they provide it free) is at best
a sleight of hand. But only in the government-sponsored polls or political harangues does this ever get
confused with national identity and citizenship. 
In the real world of health care Canadians live by, the principle is simply that it is unhelpful to rock
the boat. Bricolage has already begun to effect the required repairs to the system through appropriation
of whatever techniques would appear to be most effective, including those emerging from the United
States. This movement of silent reform will slowly replace the existing emphasis on redistribution
(which is costly and ineffective) with more effective and cheaper insurance schemes (Mandel 1996).
The same may be said about education: the staunch defense of our public education system has never
been stronger than at the very moment when Canada is sotto voce creating both private schools and
universities galore.
Canadian distinctiveness does not, therefore, lie with the safety net. And this may be good news since
the safety net is under strain. Rather, it lies with the Canadian mastery of weak ties, with Canada’s
capacity to build on loose casual social connections, with its capacity to elaborate a modus vivendi
of heterogeneous and diverse groups. The leitmotiv is therefore likely to be the appropriate insurance
for our high-risk society, rather than income and wealth redistribution. 
This emphasis on weak ties in the new social arrangements reminds one of Schopenhauer’s parable
about porcupines: in the cold of winter, these creatures  have found ways to be close enough to bring
each other some warmth, but not too close to hurt each other. This means a new form of civic
engagement that should not be confused with the sort of social cohesion and pacification that is
supposed to ensue from the massive redistribution of income and wealth (Paquet 2000). 
As for the success of recent commercials about ‘canadianness’, it is an interesting illustration of20
Canadians’ general taste for self-deprecation and irony. The success of the Molson commercial is less
evidence of suppressed patriotism than evidence of our immense taste for an ironic view of ourselves,
for self-mockery. This is the same explanation for the popularity of “La petite vie” or “This Hour Has
22 Minutes”. 
Conclusion
Let us clearly restate our main point. Canadian distinctiveness is not a set of static and arrested traits,
but a certain habitus – i.e., a certain set of propensities or proclivities which becomes the dominant
logic in the face of challenges and pressures. This dynamic réactique defines the characteristics of
the socio-economic system in its dual process of adapting to its environment and adopting (i.e.,
bestowing a greater probability of success on) certain types of behaviour by actors or organizations
in the system. This is what we mean when we refer to the “Canadian world”, a distinctive world
rooted in special equipment (physical, organizational, legal, etc.), tasks and identities – all integrated
into a certain style. This dynamic is in turn anchored in an integrated ensemble of assets, skills and
capabilities which are also evolving as a result of pressures both from the external environment and
from the evolving internal ‘Canadian world’ itself.
It is not possible to define this dynamic ‘Canadian distinctiveness’ in all its complexity in a few
paragraphs, but one may  identify the main features of the worldview that underpins it, and the ways
in which this distinctiveness has crystallized in reaction to anomalies and pressures in different sites.
Our hypothesis is that this habitus has been characterized by irony + bricolage – i.e., a certain denial
and disingenuousness at the rhetorical level, and a certain ad hocery at the level of practice. This
approach, by avoiding grand narratives and grand designs, generates an aloofness de bon aloi at the
level of discourse, and the sort of practicality in action capable of  generating piecemeal reform in a
country that is relatively averse to change.
One  major  benefit  of  this  approach  (devoid  of ideology except perhaps for some latent soft
egalitarianism)  is  that  it  dedramatizes even the most ambitious endeavours, and that it makes
adjustment appear less painful than it really is. Some side malefits of this vision-less approach are
that it enables Canadians to avoid  fully taking part in a number of major modern debates (the
appropriate mix of liberalism, democracy, and republicanism, centralization vs. decentralization,
egalitarianism vs subsidiarity, redistribution vs insurance, etc.) and to surf over change during major
periods of transformation without a full awareness of the depth of the reforms underway, or even an
adequate appreciation of the auxiliary precautions that might be required.
 
The other papers in this session illustrate very well  the canonical Canadian capacity for ironic denial
and ad hocery. In all cases (the policy vis-à-vis the Aboriginals, the multiculturalist strategy, and the
ways in which Canadians deal with the emergence of an ever more important civic sector), I would
think one might find evidence in support of my hypothesis.
Yet it should not be presumed that Canadian distinctiveness is somewhat  ‘arrested’. Ours is “dynamic
irony” (Ross 1954:xii) for the institutional order is an emergent phenomenon: it is adaptable,
evolvable, resilient, boundless and it breeds novelty, but it is also  nonoptimal, noncontrollable,21
nonpredictable and fundamentally nonunderstandable (Kelly 1994:22-23). This explains why the
discourses about social transformation of the institutional order are so vague and non-committal
(Drucker 1994). We have to be ironic since we have to be satisfied with observing the "emergent
properties" of the new order as they materialize.
In the transition period to the new millenium, one may expect the strong affirmation of "limited
identities", considerable disconnection and challenges to most of the rigid and centralized institutions.
There will also be a growing tendency for the emergent order to become anchored at the meso-level,
and to be couched in informal rules of the game agreed to by persons who share a "web of trust". One
may even expect that, at some point, key signposts or standards will mutate -- the minting and issuing
of currency, for instance. The main challenge will not be mastering the switch from one dominant logic
to another, but learning to cope with multiple dominant logics and therefore with concurrent
distributed institutional orders (Paquet 1995b, 1997d).  
The new "coordination" en chantier will loosely intermediate the spectral and distributed network
world generated by the information age. In the network age, fluidity is the foundation of dynamism and
survival,  and  institutional  stability  imposes  constraints  to  relational  fluidity.  Many  predict  the
emergence of an "imperial age" reminiscent of the Roman empire under Hadrian, where the
"institutional  order"  will  aspire  to  being  no  more  than  a  loose  web  of  agreements to ensure
compatibility among open networks (Guéhenno 1993; Paquet 1994b). A baroque governance!
Obviously, this is not an ideal situation, but the optimal may not be the ideal. There is much to be
deplored about the Canadian way degenarating into denial and complacency, and revealing a
vulnerability to lethargy. Such a way of governing Canada will be costly in the long run. But there is
also much to be said for a country that has decided not to take itself too seriously, and to take to heart
the counsel of John Maynard Keynes to economists: avoid dealing with big problems, emulate the
dentists and deal with the small holes (Gordon 1975). 
For those who would welcome more passion, I suggest that an afternoon at a soccer game in Rome
might be the requisite cure. There, they would experience passion about trivia: armed guards body-
searching those coming into the stadium; vigilantly  guarding the safety of the vising team’s music
band, and ready for the most gratuitous violence at any time. 
Back in our aloof country, one can  find on the editorial page of the national  newspaper – The Globe
& Mail on June 15, 2000 – an editorial article not calling the population to arms, but one entitled “a
call to irony”.
Qui dit mieux!
On another occasion, in 1999 (Paquet 1999a), I suggested rather modestly that, in the construction of
the requisite  new sociality in keeping with the Canadian/Quebec  “spirit” (and Quebec’s spirit is
much more akin to the Canadian spirit  than Quebecers like to admit), it might not be unreasonable to22
start with tact and civility. Many ridiculed such a modest start. It looked too much like a celebration
of Band-Aid – “solving a problem with a minimum amount of effort and time and cost” (Gladwell
2000:256). 
This sort of approach always generates disdain in Canada – at least at the rhetorical level – for it
conveys a sense of dogged and indiscriminate effort. This is missing the point. Rather, it is meant to
connote the most effective way to respond to the central challenge: which is  to find ways to partition
big intractable problems into small tractable ones. This is why the Canadian way is une foule de
petites choses. 
GP/
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